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Abstract 
Experiments show that giving users incentives helps them detect errors in data and that expectations about the base rate of errors in data improve 
error detection.  However, experimental findings are often criticized as not being generalizable to organizational settings. The study reported here 
examines the generalizability of experimental findings on user detection of data errors. A field interview study was conducted to examine this 
question. Twenty interviews were conducted with users of information systems in a variety of organizational settings. The findings of the field 
interview study show that strong informal incentives, perceptions about the materiality of data errors, and perceptions about the base rate of errors 
in data affect the detection of data errors in organizational settings.  
Keywords: information quality, data quality, error detection, data errors 
Introduction 
There is a growing recognition of the importance of managing 
information (Davenport, 1997), and managers are increasingly 
recognizing the importance of information quality (Huang et 
al., 1999). Several studies show that data stored in organiza-
tional databases have a significant rate of errors (e.g., Laudon, 
1986; Madnick and Wang, 1992; Morey, 1982; Redman, 
1992). Recent developments in information systems such as 
enterprise resource systems (Escalle and Cotteleer, 1999; 
Robinson and Dilts, 1999) and data warehousing (Ferdinandi, 
1999) have increased the need to eliminate errors in data. If 
efforts to eliminate data errors are unsuccessful, the 
organizational price in terms of poor support of business 
processes and decision making is likely to be high (Redman, 
1995). 
Two approaches to eliminating errors in data are (1) validating 
data as they are input to or stored in databases and (2) 
depending on users to detect and correct errors. Two 
laboratory experiments examining the efficacy of the second 
approach have been completed.  Experiments show that 
giving users incentives helps them detect errors in data and 
that expectations about the base rate of errors in data improve 
error detection. 
The findings provide the foundation for organizational 
initiatives designed to improve error detection. However, 
experimental findings are often criticized as not being 
generalizable to organizational settings (Fromkin and 
Streufert, 1976). This paper discusses the results of a field 
interview study conducted to link the findings of laboratory 
experiments on user detection of data errors to practice in 
organizations. Twenty interviews were conducted with 
professionals in four business domains in order to increase 
our understanding of the applicability of the laboratory 
findings to organizational practices. 
The remaining sections of this paper present (1) a review of 
prior research bearing directly on the question of the 
conditions under which individuals detect errors in data, (2) a 
discussion of the theoretical framework underlying the study 
and the propositions tested in the study, (3) the results of the 
prior laboratory experiments on user detection of data errors 
(4) the design of the field interview study, (5) the results of 
the field interview study, and (6) conclusions and suggestions 
for further research.  
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Background 
The relevant research on data quality can be summarized with 
several conclusions. First, there is agreement that data 
accuracy, currency, and completeness are important aspects of 
data quality (Agmon and Ahituv, 1987; Davis and Olson, 
1985; Fox et al., 1993; Huh et al., 1990; Madnick and Wang, 
1992; Wand and Wang, 1994; Zmud, 1978). Second, error 
rates significantly greater than zero have been found in all of 
the studies addressing the extent to which data errors exist in 
databases (Ham et al., 1985; Johnson et al., 1981; Knight, 
1992; Laudon, 1986; Stone and Bublitz, 1984). Third, while 
some researchers have proposed methods designed to 
completely rid databases of errors (Janson, 1988; Svanks, 
1988; Naus, 1975; Parsaye and Chignell, 1993), others 
propose tools for determining how to best allocate limited 
resources to controlling the level of data errors (Ballou and 
Pazer, 1987; Ballou and Tayi, 1989; Ballou et al., 1987; 
Bowen, 1992; Paradice and Fuerst, 1991). Fourth, a variety of 
approaches for using imperfect data have been suggested 
(Ballou and Pazer, 1985; Ballou and Pazer, 1995; Ballou and 
Pazer, 1987; Bansal, 1993; Gaba and Winkler, 1992; 
Garfinkel et al., 1986; O’Leary, 1993; O’Neill and Vizine-
Goetz, 1988).  
The early literature on data quality argues that users are not 
very capable of finding data errors and then changing the way 
that they use the data. Several studies found evidence of poor 
performance in detecting data errors. Davis et al. (1967) 
conducted a field experiment in which approximately half the 
subjects failed to detect important errors in a banking 
statement. Laudon (1986) found that users of criminal 
information systems rarely detected errors in these records. 
Ricketts (1990) conducted a laboratory experiment in which 
over ninety percent of the subjects failed to detect a 
substantial data error in production planning reports. The 
failure of users to detect errors in data is also assumed in the 
literature on data quality that argues that resources should be 
devoted to the up-front improvement of data quality (e.g., 
Redman, 1992; Redman, 1995). 
In contrast to the findings of the early studies, Klein (1997) 
found that all of the actuaries interviewed in a field study 
reported instances in which they successfully detected errors 
in data. The degree to which data items were reviewed for 
errors prior to use was affected by the actuaries' expectations 
about the likelihood of errors in a given dataset. The actuaries 
did not attempt to detect all errors, apparently responding to a 
perceived tradeoff between the time and effort required to find 
additional errors versus the potential impact of a more 
accurate dataset. 
More recent laboratory experiments show that people detect 
data errors under some conditions. Specifically, incentives and 
expectations about the base rate of errors in data have been 
linked to performance in the detection of data errors (Klein et 
al., 1997; Klein, 1999).  
Theoretical Framework  
and Propositions 
The research model underlying this study is presented in 
Figure 1. Model constructs and the research propositions are 
discussed below. 
Error detection performance is viewed here as the successful 
or unsuccessful detection of an error in data. We argue here 
that differences in expectations about the base rate of errors in 
data and assessments of the payoffs of error detection affect 
the rate at which errors are detected through choices related to 
effort.  
Campbell's (1990) theory of performance argues that choices 
about the degree of effort to expend in a task will influence 
performance. Klein’s (1997) study of actuaries and the 
detection of data errors suggests that there are several factors 
that influence these choices when users work with imperfect 
data. Factors influencing choices related to effort in error 
detection are discussed below.  
Payoffs of Error Detection  
Formal and informal incentives, perceptions about the 
materiality of data errors, and perceptions about the ease of 
verifying and correcting suspected data errors may affect 
users’ assessments of the payoffs of error detection. 
Incentives 
Incentives may affect users’ assessments of the payoffs of 
error detection. Both formal incentives, such as increases in 
salary, bonuses, and formal recognition, as well as informal 
incentives, such as indirect links to progress in the organiza-
tion, indirect links to pay increases, and informal recognition, 
may affect error detection. 
Proposition 1: Formal incentives will positively affect 
error detection performance. 
Proposition 2: Informal incentives will positively affect 
error detection performance.   Klein 
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Materiality 
The degree of effort expended to detect a data error may be 
affected by beliefs about the materiality of errors. For 
example, users may expend more effort to detect errors that 
they believe will have a significant impact on their work. 
There is evidence from the study of the actuaries that the 
impact of data errors on the work being performed using data 
is explicitly considered in the determination of the level of 
effort to expend in error detection. For example, one actuary 
stated that there are some types of errors that he does not try 
to detect when pricing insurance because the errors would not 
have a significant impact on his calculations. 
Proposition 3. Perceptions about the materiality of data 
errors will positively affect error detection per-
formance. 
Ease of Verification and Correction  
The degree of effort expended to detect an error may also be 
affected by the ease with which an error can be verified and 
corrected. For example, individuals may not try very hard to 
detect an error if it is difficult to confirm that a suspected error 
is actually an error or if it is not possible to correct a 
confirmed error. 
Proposition 4: Perceptions about the ease of verifying 
suspected data errors will positively affect error 
detection performance. 
Proposition 5: Perceptions about the ease of correcting 
data errors will positively affect error detection 
performance. 
Expectations about the Base Rate of Errors in 
Data  
Greater effort may be devoted to error detection if users 
expect more errors in data. The study of the actuaries suggests 
that expectations about the base rate of errors in a source of 
data influence the effort devoted to error detection. For 
example, one actuary reported that she does not attempt to 
find errors in published mortality tables because she considers 
the base rate of errors in the tables to be low (Klein, 1997). 
Proposition 6: Perceptions about the base rate of errors 
will positively affect error detection performance. 
Prior Experimental Findings  
Based on the Theoretical Framework 
Two laboratory experiments based on this theoretical 
framework have been conducted. Both experiments tested the 
effect of formal incentives and expectations about the base 
rate of errors on error detection. Other constructs in the 
research model were not tested in the experiments. 
Expectations About Base 
Rate of Errors 
Payoffs of Error Detection 
 
- Formal  incentives. 
- Informal  incentives. 
-  Perceived materiality of 
data errors. 
-  Ease of verifying 
suspected errors. 
-  Ease of correcting 
errors. 
 
Effort 
Error Detection 
Performance 
Figure 1. Research Model Detecting Data Errors 
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Experiment 1 
The operationalization of the research constructs and the 
experimental findings for the first experiment are summarized 
below. The complete details of the experiment are available in 
Klein et al. (1997). 
Operationalization of Incentives and Expectations 
about the Base Rate of Errors  
216 students taking upper-level and graduate business courses 
participated in the experiment.  Subjects in the experiment 
were required to calculate pensions for the employees of a set 
of clients and to note data errors on confirmation memos to be 
sent to the clients. The incentive construct was operational-
ized through a lottery that gave subjects a 1 in 18 chance of 
winning a $100 prize. Four conditions were tested: Detection, 
Pension Calculation, Detection with False Alarm Penalty, and 
Control. In the Detection and Detection with False Alarm 
Penalty conditions, subjects were told that their performance 
on the task would be evaluated (with performance on the 
confirmation memos weighted three times as heavily as 
performance on the accrued pension calculations) and that the 
thirty percent of subjects with the best performance would be 
entered into a lottery from which one person would receive 
$100. Subjects in the Detection with False Alarm Penalty 
condition were told that the number of errors noted and the 
amount of unnecessary costs incurred by the client would be 
considered in the evaluation of the quality of their confirma-
tion memos. Subjects in the Pension Calculation condition 
were told that their performance on the task would be 
evaluated (with performance on the accrued pension 
calculations weighted three times as heavily as performance 
on the confirmation memos) and that the thirty percent of 
subjects with the best performance would be entered into a 
lottery from which one person would receive $100. The $100 
prizes were not contingent on task performance in the Control 
condition. 
The expectations about the base rate of errors construct was 
operationalized by giving subjects information about the error 
rate of data provided by the clients in the past. Three 
conditions were tested: High, Low, and Control. In the high 
base rate condition, a memo stated that the clients for whom 
the subjects would be performing the accrued pension 
calculation task tend to provide data containing a lot of errors. 
In the low base rate condition, a memo stated that the clients 
for whom the subjects would be performing the accrued 
pension calculation task tend to provide data mostly free of 
errors. No mention of the accuracy of the data provided by the 
clients in the past is made in a memo read by subjects in the 
control condition. 
Results of Experiment 1  
The expectations about the base rate of errors factor did not 
affect the number of data errors found, but the incentive factor 
did (p=.0001). Subjects could find a maximum of 36 data 
errors. Table 1 shows the number of errors detected and the 
detection rate for each of the four levels of the incentive 
factor. 
 Error  Detection 
Performance
1 
Detection  20.0 (.56) 
Pension Calculation  16.0 (.44) 
Detection with False 
Alarm Penalty 
13.8 (.38) 
Control  12.2 (.34) 
1Each cell in this column gives the mean number of errors 
detected followed by the detection rate in parentheses. 
Table 1. Error Detection Performance in Experiment 1 
Using the Tukey method of multiple comparisons with a 
family confidence coefficient of .95, it was concluded that: (1) 
subjects in the Detection condition found significantly more 
data errors than subject in the other three conditions and (2) 
subjects in the Pension Calculation condition found 
significantly more data errors than subjects in the Control 
condition. 
Experiment 2 
The operationalization of the research constructs and the 
experimental findings for the second experiment are 
summarized below. The complete details of the experiment 
are available in Klein (1999). 
Operationalization of Incentives and Expectations 
about the Base Rate of Errors  
The incentive factor was operationalized as in Experiment 1. 
Three levels were tested: Detection, Control, and No 
Incentive. The Detection and Control conditions from 
Experiment 1 were used in this experiment. A third level with 
no possibility of winning a prize was added (No Incentive).  
The expectations about the base rate of errors construct was 
operationalized through direct experience. Three levels were 
tested: High, Low, and Control. In the High base rate   Klein 
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condition, subjects performed the pension calculations using a 
dataset containing an error rate of 30 percent before 
performing the pension calculations for a second target 
division. In the Low base rate condition, subjects performed 
the pension calculations using a dataset containing an error 
rate of four percent before performing the pension calcula-
tions for a second target division. In the Control condition 
subjects had no prior experience from which to develop base 
rate expectations before performing the pension calculations 
for the target division. The error rate for the target division 
was the same (10 of the 50 records contained an error) for all 
the experimental conditions. 
Results of Experiment 2 
The incentive factor and the expectations about the base rate 
of errors factor both affected the number of errors detected in 
the target division (p=.0001 for both factors). Subjects could 
find a maximum of 10 data errors in the target division. Table 
2 shows the number of errors detected and the detection rate 
for each of the four levels of the incentive factor and the three 
levels of the expectations about the base rate of errors factor.  
Base Rate Expectations   
High Control  Low 
Detection  7.5 (.75)  5.6 (.56)  3.4 (.34) 
Control  5.1 (.51)  3.4 (.34)  3.0 (.30) 
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
No 
Incentive 
3.9 (.39)  3.3 (.33)  2.4 (.24) 
Each cell gives the mean number of errors detected followed 
by the detection rate in parentheses. 
Table 2. Error Detection Performance in Experiment 2.  
Using a family confidence coefficient of .95 for the incentives 
factor, it was concluded that subjects in the Detection 
condition found more data errors than subjects in the Random 
condition and that subjects in the Detection condition found 
more data errors than subjects in the No Incentive condition. 
The following conclusions were drawn for the base rate 
expectations factor using a family confidence coefficient of 
.95: (1) subjects in the High condition found more data errors 
than subjects in the Control condition, (2) subjects in the High 
condition found more data errors than subjects in the Low 
condition, and (3) subjects in the Control condition found 
more data errors than subjects in the Low condition.  
Design of the Field Interview Study 
A field interview study was conducted to examine the 
generalizability of the experimental findings to organizational 
settings. Rather than focusing exclusively on incentives and 
expectations about the base rate of errors, the field interview 
study examines payoffs of error detection more broadly by 
examining the effects of formal incentives, informal 
incentives, perceptions about the materiality of data errors, 
and perceptions about the ease of verifying and correcting 
data errors on the detection of data errors. 
Interviews were conducted in four professional domains: (1) 
consumer product management, (2) inventory management, 
(3) municipal bond analysis, and (4) actuarial science. None 
of the actuaries interviewed in the initial study of actuaries 
and error detection were interviewed in this study. Instead, 
new participants were recruited. Interviews were conducted in 
the four different professional domains to make it more likely 
that we would interview users with a broad spectrum of 
perceptions about the research constructs. The choice of 
domains follows the advice of Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin 
(1989) with respect to the selection of theoretically interesting 
cases. 
Five professionals were selected from each of the four 
professional domains. To control for selection bias, potential 
interviewees were asked to participate in a study of the use of 
data in their work. The terms "error detection" and "data 
quality" were not used when recruiting subjects. Data were 
collected using a semi-structured interview. Several of the 
questions in the interview protocol are a variation on the 
critical incidents methodology developed by Flanagan (1954). 
These questions were designed to elicit descriptions of 
incidents in which the interviewees successfully detected 
errors in data. 
The semi-structured interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
An analysis of the interview transcripts was performed using 
methodologies outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
King (1994). A coding scheme based on the theoretical 
framework was developed, and the transcripts were coded 
using this scheme. 
Two researchers independently coded four of the interview 
transcripts. Overall, the level of agreement was 94 percent. 
The two coders were in complete agreement about the 
presence or absence of evidence reflecting incidents of error 
detection. One coder scored the remaining eighteen 
transcripts. Detecting Data Errors 
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Results 
Each of the twenty interviewees was classified as either 
reporting an incident in which a data error was detected or not 
reporting an incident in which a data error was detected. An 
example of an error detection incident described by one of the 
interviewees is available in Appendix A. The classification 
for each interviewee is shown in the third column of the table 
in Appendix B 
Results for the effects of users’ perceptions about the payoffs 
of error detection and expectations about the base rate of 
errors in data will be discussed in turn. 
Payoffs and Error Detection 
Perceptions about the payoffs of error detection are divided 
into five categories: (1) formal incentives, (2) informal 
incentives, (3) perceptions about the materiality of data errors, 
(4) perceptions about the ease of verifying suspected data 
errors, and (5) perceptions about the ease of correcting data 
errors. Each interviewee was assigned a judgment of High, 
Moderate, or Low for each of these five categories when the 
interview transcripts were coded. The judgements for each of 
the interviewees are shown in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, 
and eighth columns of the table in Appendix B.   
Formal Incentives.  
Table 3 shows the number of interviewees judged to have 
High, Moderate, and Low formal incentives to detect errors 
who did and did not report detecting data errors. Notice that 
none of the interviewees who did not report error detection 
incidents reported that strong or moderate formal incentives to 
detect data errors exist in their organizations. In contrast, five 
of the interviewees who did report error detection incidents 
also reported strong or moderate formal incentives to detect 
data errors. 
Even so, a chi-square test does not support the hypothesis that 
there is a relationship between formal incentives and error 
detection at a level of significance of .05 (χ 2
2= 2.85; p>.10), 
possibly because of a small sample size.  
   Formal Incentives 
Performance  High Moderate Low 
Error Detected  1  4  9 
Error Not 
Detected 
0 0  6 
Table 3. Relationship Between Formal Incentives and 
Performance 
Informal Incentives.  
Table 4 shows the number of interviewees judged to have 
High, Moderate, and Low informal incentives to detect errors 
who did and did not report detecting data errors. Notice that 
none of the interviewees who did not report error detection 
incidents reported that strong informal incentives to detect 
data errors exist in their organizations. In contrast, seven of 
the interviewees who did report error detection incidents also 
reported strong informal incentives to detect data errors. 
 Informal  Incentives 
Performance  High Moderate Low 
Error Detected  7  4  3 
Error Not 
Detected 
0 2  4 
Table 4. Relationship Between Informal Incentives and 
Performance 
Even so, a chi-square test does not support the hypothesis that 
there is a relationship between informal incentives and error 
detection at a level of significance of .05 (χ 2
2= 5.467; p < 
.10). Because this test is not statistically significant, an 
exploratory analysis was performed to determine whether the 
effect of a high level of informal incentives is different than 
the effect of moderate or low incentives. Table 5 pools the 
interviewees reporting moderate or low incentives to detect 
errors.   Klein 
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 Informal  Incentives 
Performance High  Moderate/Low 
Error Detected  7  7 
Error Not 
Detected 
0 6 
Table 5. Relationship Between High Levels of Informal 
Incentives and Performance 
A chi-square test for this contingency table suggests that the 
effect of a high level of informal incentives on error detection 
performance is different than the effect of all lower levels of 
informal incentives to detect errors (χ 1
2
 = 4.61; p < .05). 
Materiality.  
Table 6 shows the number of interviewees judged to have 
High, Moderate, and Low perceptions of the materiality of 
data errors who did and did not report detecting data errors. 
Notice that none of the interviewees who did not report error 
detection incidents reported that errors in data are highly 
material to business outcomes. In contrast, eight of the 
interviewees who did report error detection incidents also 
reported that errors in data are highly material to business 
outcomes. 
  Materiality 
Performance  High Moderate Low 
Error Detected  8  3  3 
Error Not 
Detected 
0 1  5 
Table 6. Relationship Between Materiality and Perform-
ance 
A chi-square test supports the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between the materiality of data errors and self-
reports of error detection (χ 2
2= 7.50; p < .05). 
Ease of Verifying Suspected Errors.  
Table 7 shows the number of interviewees judged to have 
High, Moderate, and Low perceptions of the ease of verifying 
suspected data errors who did and did not report detecting 
data errors. Half (three out of six) of the interviewees who did 
not report error detection incidents reported that the ease of 
verifying suspected data errors is high. This proportion is 
almost as high as for those interviewees who reported error 
detection incidents. Eight out of fourteen of the interviewees 
who reported error detection incidents also reported that it is 
easy to verify suspected data errors. 
A chi-square test does not support the hypothesis that there is 
a relationship between the ease of verifying suspected data 
errors and error detection (χ 2
2= .086; p > .10).  
  Ease of Verifying 
Suspected Data Errors 
Performance High  Moderate  Low 
Error Detected  8  6  0 
Error Not 
Detected 
3 3  0 
Table 7. Relationship Between Verifying Suspected Data 
Errors and Performance 
Ease of Correcting Errors.  
Table 8 shows the number of interviewees judged to have 
High, Moderate, and Low perceptions of the ease of 
correcting data errors who did and did not report detecting 
data errors. Half (three out of six) of the interviewees who did 
not report error detection incidents reported that the ease of 
correcting data errors is high. This proportion is not quite as 
high as for those interviewees who did report error detection 
incidents. Sixty-four percent (nine out of fourteen) of the 
interviewees who reported error detection incidents also 
reported that it is easy to correct data errors.  
  Ease of Correcting Data 
Errors 
Performance High  Moderate  Low 
Error Detected  9  5  0 
Error Not 
Detected 
3 2  1 
Table 8. Relationship Between Correcting Data Errors 
and Performance Detecting Data Errors 
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A chi-square test does not support the hypothesis that there is 
a relationship between the ease of verifying and correcting 
data errors and error detection (χ 2
2= 2.48; p > .10).  
Base Rate of Errors and Error Detection 
The last column of the table in Appendix B presents the 
estimates of the base rate of errors for the twenty interview-
ees. Interviewees were asked to discuss the types of reports 
that they use and estimate the number of these reports 
containing at least one serious data error. All of the base rate 
estimates in Appendix B refer to the percentage of these 
reports believed to contain at least one serious data error. 
Some of the interviewees provided base rate estimates for 
several types of reports and some of the interviewees provided 
a range when asked for an error rate for a particular type of 
report. For these interviewees, the numbers presented in Table 
9 are the average base rate estimate given. 
Table 9 shows the number of interviewees with High, 
Moderate, and Low rates of serious data errors who did and 
did not report detecting data errors. Because we had no a 
priori definition of low, moderate, and high rates of errors, the 
twenty observations were split into three roughly equal 
groups. The judgment Low was assigned to the seven 
interviewees who gave base rate estimates less than one 
percent. The judgment Moderate was assigned to the six 
interviewees who gave base rate estimates less than or equal 
to five percent. The judgment High was assigned to the seven 
interviewees who gave base rate estimates greater than five 
percent. 
  Perceived Base Rates 
Performance  High Moderate Low 
Error Detected  7  5  2 
Error Not 
Detected 
0 1  5 
Table 9. Relationship Between Perceived Base Rates and 
Performance 
A chi-square test supports the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between the perceived base rate of errors and 
error detection (χ 2
2= 10.60; p < .005). 
Discussion of Results and Conclusion 
Table 10 summarizes the findings for each of the research 
propositions. Results for the field interview study as well as 
the prior laboratory experiments are presented. 
The findings of the field interview study suggest that the 
materiality of data errors and expectations about the base rate 
of errors are related to error detection performance. Although 
we did not find a straight-forward relationship between 
different levels of incentives to detect errors and error 
detection performance, it appears that users who believe that 
strong informal incentives to detect data errors are present in 
their organizations are more likely to detect errors than those 
without this belief. 
The central question posed in this paper is whether the 
findings of laboratory experiments on user detection of data 
errors are generalizable to organizational settings. The results 
of the study provide some support for the contention that the 
laboratory findings are generalizable. 
First, the generalizability of the finding that base rate 
expectations developed through direct experience affect error 
detection is supported by the results of the field study. Users 
with perceptions of higher error rates are more likely to report 
incidents of error detection than users with perceptions of 
lower error rates. As in laboratory experiment 2, users in 
organizational settings typically develop expectations about 
the base rate of errors in data through direct experience 
working with data. 
The generalizability of the laboratory finding that incentives 
affect error detection performance is less clearly supported by 
the field interviews. Strong formal incentives to detect data 
errors were simply not reported by the vast majority of the 
interviewees working in organizations. The lack of strong 
formal incentives in organizations makes it difficult to 
adequately test the generalizability of this laboratory finding. 
However, the field interviews do show that strong informal 
incentives are associated with incidents of error detection. 
This suggests that formal incentives to detect data errors 
might have an even stronger effect on detection performance 
if they were implemented in organizations.   Klein 
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There is also additional evidence that users’ assessments of 
the payoffs of error detection in the form of perceptions about 
the materiality of data errors affect error detection. Percep-
tions of the ease of verifying and correcting data errors did not 
have this effect primarily because most users believe it is easy 
to verify suspected data errors and correct confirmed errors. 
Limitations of the study.  
There are a number of limitations inherent in the methodology 
used in the field interview study. First, we were not able to 
gather objective performance measures using the interview 
methodology. Instead, we measured performance through self-
reported data. One limitation of self-reported performance is 
potential biases in accounts of error detection. For example, 
some interviewees might have forgotten incidents in which 
they found errors in data. 
Second, it is not possible to be certain about the directionality 
of relationships among the research constructs using data 
collected in field interviews. It is possible, for example, that 
the experience of detecting data errors causes users to 
increase their estimates of organizational incentives to detect 
errors, the materiality of data errors, and the base rate of 
errors in data. This methodological weakness is less of a 
limitation in this field study than would typically be the case 
because the causal links are clear in the complementary 
laboratory experiments (Klein et al., 1997, Klein, 1999). 
Third, there are few subjects in some of the cells of the 
contingency tables used in the analysis of the field data. The 
findings of the study should, therefore, be confirmed in a 
larger scale study and in experimental research.  
Directions for future research.  
Additional studies addressing the detection of errors in data 
by users of information systems could take several paths. Two 
avenues will be suggested here. First, studies to develop and 
test prescriptive interventions to improve error detection 
based on the findings of the experiments and the field 
Proposition  Findings from Field Interviews  Findings from Prior Laboratory 
Experiments 
P1: Formal incentives will 
positively affect error detection 
performance. 
Little evidence that formal 
incentives to detect data errors 
exist in organizations.  
P2: Informal incentives will 
positively affect error detection 
performance. 
A high level of informal incentives 
is associated with better error 
detection performance. 
Supported for cash prize 
incentives. 
P3: Perceptions about the 
materiality of data errors will 
positively affect error detection 
performance. 
Supported. Not  tested. 
P4: Perceptions about the ease of 
verifying suspected data errors 
will positively affect error 
detection performance. 
Not supported.  Not tested. 
P5: Perceptions about the ease of 
correcting data errors will 
positively affect error detection 
performance. 
Not supported.  Not tested. 
P6: Perceptions about the base 
rate of errors will positively 
affect error detection performance. 
Supported. 
Base rate expectations developed 
through direct experience affect 
error detection performance. 
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interviews should be conducted. Second, there is little 
evidence that organizations are using formal incentive systems 
to improve user error detection. We argue that organizational 
incentives linking performance evaluations, employee 
compensation, and formal employee recognition to important 
information quality objectives should be developed and 
tested. 
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Appendix A 
Example of an Error Detection Incident 
The following error detection incident is excerpted from the transcript of an interview with a municipal bond analyst. 
I just got one the other day which sent me two different reports with totally different numbers on them…The same 
hospital sent two reports. I don’t know which is accurate…This was this hospital in New Jersey…The numbers I’m 
reading are the first quarter 1994 which is three months into March 31
st, 1994. Now, one report they’re sending me 
says, it’s entitled key financial indicators…It lists their admission of 2344. Another report which they sent me…lists 
their admissions at 3077 which is 700 different. That’s a significant difference. I’m like “what is going on here?” 
Patient days they list at 18,445 on the key indicator report and 19,406 days on the other report. Length of stay is listed 
7.9 on the key indicator report and 6.3 on the other report. And this just goes on and on and on. Every one of these is 
different. They are completely different. And I don’t know where these numbers are coming from.  
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Appendix B 
Summary of Analysis of Interview Transcripts 
 
Interviewee 
Number 
Professional 
Domain
1 
Error 
Detected 
Formal 
Incentives 
Informal 
Incentives 
Perceived 
Materiality 
Ease of 
Verifying 
Errors 
Ease of 
Correcting 
Errors 
Base 
Rate of 
Errors 
1 CPM  Yes  Low  Low  Low  Moderate  High  4% 
2  CPM  Yes Low  Low Low  High High 1% 
3  CPM  No  Low  Low  Low  Moderate Moderate 0% 
4  CPM  No  Low  Low Moderate  High High 0.5% 
5 CPM  No  Low  Low  Low  Moderate  Low  0% 
6  IM  No  Low  Moderate Low  Moderate Moderate 0% 
7  IM  No  Low  Low Low  High High 0.5% 
8  IM  Yes Low  Low High  High High 7.5% 
9  IM  No  Low  Moderate  Low  High High 2% 
10  IM  Yes Low  High High  High High 0.5% 
11  MBA  Yes Moderate  High High  High High 5.5% 
12  MBA  Yes  Low  High  High  Moderate Moderate 5.3% 
13  MBA  Yes Low  Moderate  Low  High High 3.4% 
14  MBA  Yes  High  High  High  Moderate Moderate 0% 
15  MBA  Yes Moderate  High High  High High 4.8% 
16  ACT  Yes  Low  High  Moderate  Moderate Moderate 5% 
17  ACT  Yes Moderate  Moderate  Moderate  High High 70% 
18  ACT  Yes  Low  Moderate Moderate  Moderate Moderate 90% 
19  ACT  Yes  Low  Moderate High  Moderate Moderate 100% 
20  ACT  Yes Moderate  High High  High High 95% 
1CPM=Consumer product management; IM=Inventory management; MBA = Municipal bond analysis; ACT=Actuarial science. 
 